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Economic theory suggests that when the benefits of breaching an
agreement exceed the costs of complying with an agreement, the sys-
tem governing the agreement should allow a party to breach the agree-
ment. On the other hand, when the costs of breach outweigh the bene-
fits of breach, the governance mechanisms should create an incentive
for a party to comply with the agreement. The theory of efficient
breach predicts that parties will attempt to forge mechanisms that
allow efficient breaches and deter inefficient breaches. In the domestic
arena, the breaching party itself can determine if the breach is effi-
cient: The breach is efficient if the party can afford to pay damages.
In the international arena, there is little chance that a state will be
forced to pay damages for breaching an agreement. International law
must provide specifically whether a breach is legal or illegal.
In bilateral agreements, parties attempt to achieve efficiency
through the use of informal governance mechanisms such as economic
hostages and collateral. In multilateral agreements such as the Gener-
al Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), breach is allowed when
compliance would be politically untenable. Other breaches are pun-
ished with retaliatory trade measures. In minilateral agreements such
as the EEC, breaches are not countenanced. As minilateral agreements
take on federal characteristics, states are expected to comply with all
undertakings.
This article tests the theory of efficient breach in international
agreements under three of the four governance structures outlined by
Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough.
I. INTRODUCTION: EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT BREACHES OF
DOMESTIC CONTRACTS
One of the central tenets of domestic contract law is the compen-
sation principle: a party that breaches a contract should pay only the
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resulting damages caused by the breach. The compensation principle
has been justified by the theory that some breaches of contracts are
efficient; i.e. the aggregate benefits of breach outweigh the aggregate
costs. The theory of efficient breach is rooted deeply in Anglo-American
law. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said,
[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and nothing
else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum. If you [enter] a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the
nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics
into the law as they can ....
In a domestic setting, an agreement that binds two parties is a
contract. 2 In an apartment lease, for example, a landlord grants per-
mission to a tenant to live in the apartment. In exchange, the tenant
agrees to pay rent. If either party fails to perform its obligations under
the lease, the non-breaching party may bring suit in a court of law.
The court can order the breaching party to pay money damages to the
non-breaching party in the amount equal to the loss to the non-
breaching party.
With some exceptions, the law of contract damages adheres to the
compensation principle. There are four major ways of awarding damag-
es in Anglo-American law. Expectation damages represent the amount
of money that would put the non-breaching party in the position in
which it would have been if the contract had been performed, i.e. if the
non-breaching party's expectations had been fulfilled. Reliance damag-
es represent the amount of damages sufficient to place the non-breach-
ing party in its pre-contract position. Courts order specific performance
of a contract obligation if the subject matter of the contract is unique
or the benefits of performance are idiosyncratic, such as where the
seller of a home breaches his agreement to sell. Finally, courts order
restitution of money that has been transferred to the breaching party.
In this case, the non-breaching party may choose the measure of dam-
ages.3
Despite the threat of lawsuit, contracts are often broken. In deter-
mining whether a party will comply with a contract, a common as-
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
Other jurists believe that a contract is a moral obligation that should never be
broken.
2. The party that breaches the contract, or that may potentially breach the con-
tract, is called the "breaching party." The other party is the "non-breaching party."
3. Another method is to award damages or penalties specified in the contract
(liquidated damages and penalty clauses). Some laws also allow criminal sanctions.
Non-legal sanctions exist as well. See infra section III.
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sumption is that the non-breaching party will act rationally. A party
will break the contract if the cost of breaching the contract is less than
the cost of compliance with the contract; conversely, a party will com-
ply with the contract if the cost of breaching the contract exceeds the
cost of compliance. The legal remedy for breach affects a party's deci-
sion to breach. If the penalty is high, few breaches will occur; if the
penalty is low, breaches will occur more frequently. Thus, the legal
system can achieve an optimal rate of contract breach by awarding the
appropriate measure of damages.
There are two legal avenues that permit efficient breach. First,
there are a number of domestic legal doctrines, such as impossibility,
that completely forgive contractual performance. Second, a party can
breach a contract if it is willing to pay the cost of breach, including
paying a judgment or a settlement fee. In an efficient breach, the costs
of breach will not exceed its benefits, and the party will choose to
breach the contract.4
In addition to encouraging efficient breach, the domestic legal
system also deters inefficient breach. First, damages are imposed on
the breaching party in the amount of the harm that falls on the non-
breaching party. Second, the non-breaching party may make a side
payment to the potential breaching party to induce it not to breach the
contract. A side payment will prevent a breach if the harm to the non-
breaching party (and thus the amount of money it is willing to pay)
exceeds the benefit to the potential breaching party.
In the domestic context, major debates have developed regarding
the encouragement of efficient breaches. The first debate concerns
whether courts should enforce penalty clauses and as to whether
courts should impose specific performance. Courts generally refuse to
enforce penalty clauses if the remedy specified in the contract exceeds
the actual damage to the non-breaching party. An argument against
enforcing penalty clauses is that awarding a penalty greater than the
actual damages forces a party to comply with a contract even when
breach would be efficient.5
4. For example, suppose that a manufacturer (the "seller") agrees to sell a ma-
chine for $100. Assume that the machine costs $80 to make. Suppose further that
the seller finds another buyer who is willing to pay $130 for the machine. If the
seller breaks his contract with the original buyer and sells to the second buyer, the
seller will earn a profit of $50 instead of a profit of $20. The benefit to the seller
for breaching the contract is the incremental increase in profit of $30. Assume that
the original buyer could have earned $110 from the machine. Breach will cause the
original buyer to lose the $110 benefit of owning the machine. But because the origi-
nal buyer will not have to pay the $100 purchase price, the original buyer's net loss
resulting from the breach is $10. Under contract law, the seller would pay $10 to
the original buyer in damages (assuming a replacement machine cannot be found at
the contract price). Because the seller can gain $30, the seller will breach the con-
tract and pay the $10 in damages and still be $20 better off. No party is worse off.
5. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
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An argument in favor of enforcing penalty clauses is that the
amount of damages specified in a contract may indicate the idiosyn-
cratic value of performance, which would otherwise be underestimated
by a court. Under this argument, the parties themselves are better
able to determine the value of the contract and the necessary damages
than a court.6 Other commentators rely on the general idea that all
clauses in a contract are efficient.7
In response, critics of penalty clauses claim that penalty clauses
may result in attempts to induce breach.' The party for whose benefit
the penalty clause operates may induce the other party to breach in
order to collect the penalty; for example, the party might withhold
certain crucial information from the other party.9 If penalty clauses
were enforced, parties would engage in a wasteful use of resources to
detect and punish inducement of breach. In the domestic context, the
induced breach argument is dubious because it presumes that parties
would inject an overcompensatory penalty clause in the contract. The
most recent attack on penalty clauses rests upon the argument that
"penalties [may] induce social inefficiency by preventing potential
actors from competing with the parties to the contract."0
Although courts are reluctant to enforce overcompensatory penalty
clauses, they typically enforce penalty clauses that undercompensate
the non-breaching party. In defense of this rule, Stole argues that it is
often rational for parties to set undercompensatory penalty clauses.
Such clauses, Stole contends, communicate valuable pre-bargain infor-
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 567-68 (1977). Another argument against
overcompensation is that the purpose of contract law is not to punish but to com-
pensate. Id.
6. Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damages Clauses in Contractual
Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582, 583 (1992).
7. Id. at 582 ("Economists have long recognized that agreements freely entered
into by all affected parties with full information and cognizance of the terms of
trade necessarily improve social welfare in the traditional Pareto sense."). For de-
fenses of penalty clauses on efficiency grounds, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at
558-77; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J.
LEG. STUD. 277, 286-87 (1972); Alvin C. Brightman, Liquidated Damages, 25 COLUM.
L. REV. 277, 279-81, 302 (1925); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Perfor-
mance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 356
(1984); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law
of Contract, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 105, 137 (1989).
8. Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger L. Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated
Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Tai-Yeong Chung, On The Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses:
An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 280, 281 (1992); see also Phillippe
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 338
(1987); Peter Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and
Breach of Contract. I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 283 (1979).
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mation and should be upheld by courts."
The second debate is whether courts should award monetary dam-
age or specific performance."2 For instance, if a seller fails to deliver a
unique product, such as land, courts may award specific performance
because money damages would not adequately compensate the injured
party for its losses. If the product is not unique, however, courts award
monetary damages."
One major analytical insight recognizes that negotiation costs are
higher if the breaching party can rely on specific performance rather
than damages. 4 Under a money damage system, the only information
the parties need to negotiate a solution is the amount of damages suf-
fered by the non-breaching party. 5 Once this figure is determined,
the breaching party pays the other the agreed upon amount and subse-
quently breaches the contract.
Under a specific performance regime, however, where the non-
breaching party has the power to deny the breaching party the bene-
fits of breaching the contract, both parties require more information
during negotiation. For example, if the buyer can demand specific per-
formance, but the seller wants to sell to a different buyer, the original
buyer may attempt to force the seller to pay all the benefits of the
breach. In order to extract the benefits of the breach, the original buy-
er must assess the exact amount of the potential benefits to the seller.
The benefits of breach are typically the benefits arising under the con-
tract with the second buyer, less the benefits the breaching party
would have received had it complied with the terms of the original con-
tract. Thus, the first buyer must seek two pieces of information: the
benefits to the breaching party from the first agreement and from
breaching the contract.
Specific performance also creates a bilateral monopoly cost. The
greater the range of negotiation, the more likely the parties will resort
11. See Stole, supra note 6.
12. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 351
(1978) (favoring traditional distinction between unique and nonunique goods); Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (advocating
specific performance); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for
Breach, 99 Q.J. EcON. 121 (1984) (advocating specific performance for contracts "to
give" and damages for contracts "to do"); William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for
Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEG. STuD. 299 (1985) (arguing against Schwartz and
specific performance); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of
Contract, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1365 (1982).
13. One author contends, however, that these two categories can be broken down
into about twenty categories. See William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach
of Contract, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 299 (1985).
14. See id. at 311-14. See also Timothy J. Muris, Comment, The Costs of Freely
Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DuKE L.J. 1053 (1982).
15. Bishop, supra note 13, at 312.
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to strategic bargaining techniques that can kill a mutually beneficial
agreement. Specific performance widens the range of bargaining, and
thus increases the probability of breakdown. In comparison, an optimal
court system would penalize all breaches of contract by imposing a fine
on the breaching party equal to the damage done. Such an ideal sys-
tem would allow efficient breach and deter inefficient breach.
It should be noted that an optimal system of contract enforcement
does not exist, even in domestic law. For example, it is not necessarily
true that the domestic court system punishes a breach of contract by
the amount of damage done. The costs of litigation, both time and
money, may deter a plaintiff with a good chance of success from litigat-
ing to recover damages. Thus, potential plaintiffs have designed a
number of self-help remedies to punish breaching parties without re-
sorting to litigation. Returning to the earlier example, a landlord may
avoid litigation costs by seizing a tenant's security deposit, evicting the
tenant summarily, or damaging the tenant's reputation. Extra-legal
sanctions such as these are sometimes more important than the legal
sanctions.16
II. EXTENDING EFFICIENT BREACH TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The differences between domestic and international agreements
are reflected in the normative and positive aspects of the theory of
efficient breach. This section examines certain general properties of
international agreements that affect efficient breach.
A. Reasons for Breaching Treaties
The assumption of rationalism is as valid in the international
arena as in the domestic arena: it is reasonable to assume that nations
weigh the costs and benefits before violating an agreement. Louis
Henkin argues that "usually a nation deliberately violates a norm or
agreement because it expects that the advantages of violation will
outweigh its costs. Faced with the temptation to act in disregard of law
or obligation, the government will know what it hopes to gain .... "',
There are three broad reasons that nations break treaties, all of
which mirror domestic contracts. The first is temporal opportunism. If
the benefits of a treaty accrue early, a state may be tempted to violate
the treaty to avoid obligations that it must perform later. 8 Thus, de-
spite the fact that ex ante the agreement would have been beneficial, a
party may be tempted to breach it once the benefits have accrued in
16. See infra section III.
17. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 69 (2d ed. 1979).
18. THOMAS HOBBES, LEViATHAN 68 (The Scholar Press Limited, 1969) (1651)
("For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe af-
ter .... ").
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favor of that party.19 A good example is a bilateral investment trea-
ty.20 The guest country performs first by, for instance, investing in the
host country's copper mine. The host country performs its main obli-
gation last by refraining from expropriating the investment. However,
the temptation to expropriate in violation of the agreement often
proves too strong. A common remedy for temporal opportunism rests in
the design of a contract specifying that each party is to perform its
obligations simultaneously.2
Second, a state might threaten to breach in order to extract con-
cessions from the other side. This prospect underlies Yarbrough &
Yarbrough's theory of strategic organization.2
Third, the costs and benefits of adhering to a treaty may change
during the course of performance, causing one state to breach even -
though ex ante the state would have adhered to the treaty. For exam-
ple, suppose that the gross benefit of a treaty was $10 billion at the
time a state signed it, but the benefit then falls to $5 billion before the
country has performed its obligations. If the cost of the obligation is $7
billion, the country would breach the treaty (assuming it does not
suffer any legal or extra-legal punishment).
B. Uncompensated Injury
One objection to the theory of efficient breach in the domestic
sphere is that breach of a contract prejudices the interests of the non-
breaching party. However, the non-breaching party can be fully com-
pensated, at least in theory, if a court awards damages equal to the
damage caused by the breach. Even if damages are not awarded, the
non-breaching party will be compensated ex ante for the risk of breach
if there are no transaction costs. Suppose, for example, that during
19. Many domestic agreements require a party to perform its duties at a dif-
ferent time than its counterpart. For example, a grocery store that sells on credit
performs its part of the agreement first because it supplies the goods. The consumer
pays later. The party that performs last is tempted to breach its obligation to per-
form.
20. See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985).
21. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 5, 10 (1985).
22. Yarbrough & Yarbrough write:
The strategic organizational perspective ... would lead us to expect
unilateral liberalization only by countries with good alternatives to their
current trade arrangements, that is, by countries facing little or no
threat of opportunism by trading partners. This is the case whenever
the country has little investment in relation-specific assets for trade that
can be held up by an opportunistic trading partner.
BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 56 (1992)
[hereinafter Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992)].
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negotiations both parties know that there is a fifty percent probability
that, under a change of circumstances, the breaching party would
benefit one hundred dollars by breaching the contract. Suppose further
that the cost of breach to the non-breaching party would be forty dol-
lars. Breach would be efficient because the benefits of breaching (one
hundred dollars) exceed the costs to the other party (forty dollars). The
non-breaching party will protect itself from the chance of breach by
demanding compensation ex ante. It will be exposed to an expected loss
of twenty dollars (fifty percent of forty dollars) if it signs the agree-
ment. It can, therefore, demand compensation from the potential
breaching party in the form of a higher price if the non-breaching
party is the seller or in the form of a higher interest rate if the non-
breaching party is a lender. As a result, even if there are no damages,
the risk of efficient breach does not injure the non-breaching party in a
world without cost.
Ex ante compensation does not usually occur in international
agreements. Typically, international agreements involve transfers of
legal obligations, not transfers of money. Such transfers are discrete
rather than continuous. For example, it would be difficult for Germany
to pay Russia $25 billion to compensate Russia for the risk that Ger-
many might breach a trade agreement. Thus, we are left with a situa-
tion in which even an efficient breach would result in an uncompensat-
ed risk to the non-breaching party.
Nonetheless, international relations succeed reasonably well in
deterring inefficient breach through informal sanctions. The mere fact
that injured parties are not compensated does not mean that nations
decline to enter into international agreements in the future. The bene-
fits of an agreement will often outweigh its costs, even if the costs
include the risk of uncompensated breach. The failure to compensate
injuries resulting from efficient acts does not make a system untena-
ble. As an illustration, consider the common law of negligence. A plain-
tiff cannot recover for a defendant's action if the benefits of the action
outweigh the risk to the plaintiff since such action is reasonable and,
therefore, not actionable in a court of law.
As for ex post compensation, few examples can be found in inter-
national law. Among them are the measures authorized by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in response to subsidies or
dumping. A domestic industry can lobby its government to raise tariffs
on products imported from a country that engages in subsidies or
dumping. The resulting increase in the domestic price level compen-
sates the domestic producers.
C. The Morality of Breaking a Treaty
One objection to efficient breach is that a party has a moral obli-
gation to keep an agreement. This objection has often been rejected in
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domestic law on the grounds that the purpose of law is to increase
aggregate welfare, not to enforce obedience to an agreement if such
obedience has no practical utility.'
D. Goals of Treaty Policy: Interest Groups and Relative Gains
Maximization
A treaty does not necessarily improve a nation's welfare. In do-
mestic law, theorists assume that any contract willingly entered into
by an individual is in that person's best interest. As Hobbes wrote,
[wihensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is
either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to
himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a
voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is
some Good to himselfe.24
Nations, however, are controlled by interest groups that seek to maxi-
mize their own wealth rather than that of the country.' Thus, in-
ternational agreements may increase the welfare of a particular inter-
est group but not the citizenry as a whole. The negotiation of free
trade agreements is an exception, at least as an initial matter, to the
theory that treaties are instruments of wealth-seeking. Once a free
trade agreement is in effect, however, interest groups exert a heavy
influence on nations' compliance and sanctioning behavior.6
Nations also may not maximize welfare because they sometimes
pursue relative, rather than absolute, gains. In domestic situations, it
is assumed that a party will attempt to maximize its absolute gains;
furthermore, if there are no transaction costs, parties in a contractual
relationship maximize their joint gains. In international relations,
however, Joseph Grieco contends that states sometimes maximize
relative gains, not absolute gains.2 7 Thus, even if there were a net
cost to the breach of an agreement, a party might nonetheless breach
its treaty in order to impose costs on its treaty partners. As a result of
relative gains maximization, states may not sign an agreement at all.
Recently, the relative gains thesis has been challenged. Robert
Keohane contends that relative gains are maximized only when states
23. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 1.
24. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 65-66.
25. According to public choice theory, laws are enacted to increase the welfare of
interest groups at the expense of the rest of society. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
26. See JAMES BOvARD, FAIR TRADE FRAuD (1991) (discussing U.S. trade behav-
ior).
27. Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INTL ORG. 485, 487 (1988) ("[A] state that
is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless
exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains.").
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pursue "positional goods," such as status.2" Charles Lipson contends
that relative gains matter only in security relationships.' Further-
more, Duncan Snidal has shown that relative gains will bar cooper-
ation only if few states are involved.3"
E. General Legal Differences
There are three major legal differences between domestic con-
tracts and international agreements. First, the parties to international
agreements are states, not individual actors; all the state's domestic
actors - individuals, politicians, interest groups, and political parties
- are compressed into one negotiating unit. Second, unlike domestic
agreements, international agreements vary widely in formality and in
enforceability. Some international agreements are meant to be non-
binding.3 ' Some international agreements are subject to strict third
party enforceability (e.g. by the European Union), while some interna-
tional agreements are enforceable only through reputation and self-
help. Enforceability is the most notorious difference between interna-
tional law and domestic law: domestic law has a body with the power
to enforce judgments against parties; international law does not.32
The methods for enforcing international agreements are considered in
section III below.
28. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 54 (1984).
29. Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,
37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984).
30. As Snidal summarizes,
[rielative gains considerations are shown to matter only for issues in-
volving small numbers of states. The impact of relative gains drops off
quickly with more than two states and is virtually irrelevant for issues
involving a large number of actors. In addition, the transition to cooper-
ation is not appreciably more difficult under relative gains than under
absolute gains.
Duncan Snidal, International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers, 35 INTL
STUD. Q. 387, 388 (1991).
31. Lipson identifies six reasons why nations choose informal agreements over
treaties. First, informal agreements can be amended more easily than treaties.
Second, informal agreements are less costly to negotiate because they do not require
that parties foresee all types of contingencies. Third, informal agreements can be
implemented quickly. Fourth, informal agreements escape oversight by democratic or-
gans because they do not have to be ratified. Fifth, informal agreements made by
one bureaucracy can escape oversight by other bureaucracies. Sixth, informal agree-
ments do not constitute as much of a commitment as do treaties. The cost of using
informal agreements rests in their lesser reliability. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INTL ORG. 495, 500-501 (1991).
32. Within international law, I include the law governing what Yarbrough &
Yarbrough call unilateralism, multilateralism, and bilateralism. See Yarbrough &
Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 17-19. Minilateral regimes, such as the EEC,
have often been distinguished from international law.
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F. Criticism of International Law as Unenforceable
The rule of pacta sunt servanda holds that states must honor
their treaty obligations.3 It has often been argued, however, that in-
ternational law is "unenforceable" because it provides for no effective
court-ordered remedy. The power of an international tribunal to assess
monetary damages is limited. First, the parties must agree to place
their disputes before the tribunal in the first place.34 Second, interna-
tional treaty law has no real central enforcement mechanism." Under
the U.N. Charter, a judgment by the International Court of Justice
against a member of the United Nations can be enforced by the Securi-
ty Council.3" However, this enforcement power has never been used.
33. Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and is also
contained in the Vieena Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."). Thus, pacta sunt servanda is doubly binding on
the signatories to the Vienna Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Republic
of Korean, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda,
Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugosla-
via, and Zaire. LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 12
(2d ed. Supp. 1987).
34. Two parties can agree to submit their disputes to the International Court of
Justice by compromis. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 art. 36. There is an obligation to submit any disputes to
arbitration if the dispute might threaten international security. Article 2, paragraph
3, of the U.N. Charter states that
[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.
Article 33, paragraph 33, of the U.N. Charter states that
[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endan-
ger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice.
Countries may submit their disputes to the tribunal at any time. Moreover, parties
may sign a treaty in which they submit all future disputes to the compulsory juris-
diction of the arbitral body. However, parties are not required to make such sub-
missions and only approximately 80 disputes have been submitted to the I.C.J.
35. An exception to the formal nonenforcement of international law is the Euro-
pean Union, which imposes effective sanctions for noncompliance. However, the EU
may be exceptional. Many scholars characterize the EU as supranational law, not
international law. For a discussion of the EU, see infra section IV(D).
36. U.N. Charter, art. 94, states as follows:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is
a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may
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The violations of the laws of war during World War I led to wide-
spread cynicism about international law. Many scholars abandoned
international law for new disciplines such as international relations.37
Yet, the failure to prevent war and wartime atrocities is not convincing
evidence of the breakdown of international law. War, with its high
stakes and its short shadow of the future, is precisely where we would
expect informal enforcement mechanisms to be least effective. Informal
mechanisms remain effective in enforcing long-term commercial ar-
rangements.
International lawyers would argue that it is a mistake to assume
that international law is unenforceable merely because there is no
central authority to punish violators.' For example, the United
States Supreme Court does not have any enforcement mechanism to
require the Congress and the President to abide by its decisions. The
Court's decisions are obeyed because the other branches of government
have a respect for its legal authority. The difference between inter-
national law and domestic law (or, at least, national constitutional
law) is only in the degree of respect accorded to the law.
States find it in their interests to comply with treaties for a num-
ber of reasons, including future gains, reputation, and retaliation.39
Recent scholarship suggests that these reasons for treaty compliance
are also important in enforcing domestic contracts, thus undercutting
those who criticize international law as unenforceable.
Several factors indicate that domestic economic relations are con-
trolled not so much by legal sanctions as by non-legal sanctions. First,
litigation costs often preclude litigation as an effective enforcement
mechanism. 0 Second, a favorable judgment cannot be collected if the
defendant cannot pay. Third, we observe that parties often use extra-
legal sanctions: collateral for loans, security deposits in leases, and the
threat of damage to one's reputation."' As an empirical matter,
have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
effect to the judgment.
While the Security Council's recommendations are nonbinding, its decisions may give
rise to enforcement measures. The Security Council must vote unanimously to pass
such an enforcement measure.
37. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 134 (1988).
38. See HENKIN, supra note 17.
39. See e.g., L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27
(1980) (discussing future gains). See infra section III.
40. In small lawsuits (say, for instance, a dispute between a dry cleaner and a
customer), the cost of litigation may exceed the possible damages claimed by the
plaintiff. David Charny argues that litigation costs mean that parties are
undercompensated under domestic law. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Com-
mercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 407 (1990) (litigation costs result in
under-compensation). See also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,
1985 WIS. L. REv. 465, 469-70 (1985).
41. Consumer loans are repaid largely because consumers wish to maintain a
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Macauley notes that merchants rarely sue when sales contracts are
breached. 2
III. INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
COMPLIANCE AND SANCTIONING BEHAVIOR
It is in the interests of parties to deter breaches of agreements by
punishing breach. In addition to enforcement by the courts, there are
also informal methods of punishing breach. Although private parties
rely on both formal and informal sanctions, nations must rely exclu-
sively on informal mechanisms. Court-enforced judgments for damages
practically do not exist in the international arena."3
Anthony Kronman has outlined the types of informal sanctions
that are used to enforce agreements."" Although his explanation is
oriented toward private arrangements, it can easily be extended to
international agreements. For Kronman, informal sanctions would
operate in "the state of nature," a situation characterized by two as-
sumptions: first, where there is no third party enforcement;45 second,
where the parties cannot compel one another to perform an agreement
or to pay damages." The second assumption is particularly relevant
good credit rating. Charny, supra note 40, at 395. See also PATRICK ATIYAH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 715 (1979) ("Even between private com-
mercial organizations, the fact that business relationships are so often continuous
means that the desire to maintain the goodwill of other contracting parties is often
more important than the letter of the contract.").
42. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-62 (1963). Although parties engage in resolution
without lawsuits, Lipson rightly points out that merely because domestic actors
engage in pretrial settlement of disputes does not mean that domestic actors are
engaging in actions without the need for formal adjudication. He argues that "[wihen
parties discuss compliance after agreements have been signed, they bargain in the
shadow of law and judicial enforcement." Lipson, supra note 32, at 503.
43. Another major difference between private contracts and treaties is that some
treaties, e.g. the EEC treaty, are enforced more like federal constitutions than
agreements. Nations comply with these treaties out of respect for the federal institu-
tion behind the treaty. See infra Section Part IVD.
44. See Kronman, supra note 21, at 8. Kronman uses the term "state of nature"
to refer to the absence of third party enforcement.
45. Kronman summarizes as follows:
[Mly concept of the state of nature is a broad one, broad enough to
include any situation in which individuals and groups must arrange
their transactions (if they are to transact at all) without the aid of an
independent enforcement mechanism whose powers are significantly
greater than their own.
Id. at 9. As Kronman points out, the lack of third party adjudication is a problem
not only for enforcing transactions but also for preventing the imposition of
externalities upon other parties. Id. at 6. Thus, without third party enforcement, we
would expect to have more breaches of contract, as well as more thefts of property.
Kronman considers the first problem of transactional insecurity a more difficult prob-
lem than the second problem of possessory insecurity. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 7 ("When two individuals (or groups) exchange promises and neither
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because it matches the standard assumption of "anarchy" in interna-
tional relations. Although Kronman considers only one motivation for
breach of an agreement, nonsimultaneous performance,47 his analysis
can be applied to other reasons for breach." Kronman outlines four
different ways of enforcing agreements through self-help: hostages, col-
lateral, hand-tying, and union.
A. Hostages: Discretionary Sanctions of No Value to the Non-breaching
Party
A discretionary sanction is the ability of one party to harm the
other party.49 Assets of the breaching party that can be destroyed by
the non-breaching party are called "hostages."' The hostage must
have value to the breaching party but need not have any value to the
non-breaching party."' If the non-breaching party convinces the
breaching party that breach will result in the destruction of the asset,
then the breaching party will not breach the agreement.
Hostages have two disadvantages. First, it may be difficult for the
non-breaching party to convince the breaching party that it will indeed
destroy the vulnerable asset.52 The non-breaching party is typically
better off if it negotiates an agreement for a payment of even a small
value than if it destroys the asset. Second, the sanction may be carried
out by the non-breaching party, and the asset will be destroyed.' The
has the power to compel the other to perform, and there is also no third party
powerful enough to enforce the agreement on their behalf, I shall speak of them as
being in a state of nature vis-&-vis one another, even where both parties are able to
protect whatever they presently possess from attack or expropriation by the other.").
47. Id. at 10.
48. For the sake of convention, I will refer to Kronman's "the earlier performing
party" as the non-breaching party and the later performing party as the breaching
party.
49. One example of a discretionary sanction is loss of reputation. Often, the non-
breaching party has the discretion to destroy the reputation of a potential violator.
For example, suppose that a developing nation has decided to default on its debts to
banks in the United States. Faced with such a possibility, the United States could
either refuse to negotiate, or it could forgive at least part of the debt. If the United
States refuses to negotiate, the debtor country must unilaterally repudiate its debt,
thus suffering a severe loss of reputation. If the debtor country negotiates with the
United States, then the debt is not repudiated but renegotiated. A country that
renegotiates its debt, e.g. Mexico, suffers less of a reputational loss than a country
that repudiates its debt, e.g. Peru. Because some reputational effects are beyond the
control of the non-breaching party, reputations can also be considered an example of
"hand-tying."
50. Some later theorists use the term "hostage" to refer to sanctions that occur
automatically in case of breach. I prefer Kronman's convention of referring to such
situations as "hand-tying." See infra Part III(A)(3).
51. Daniel K Benjamin, The Use of Collateral to Enforce Debt Contracts, 16
ECON. INQUIRY 333, 354 (1978). ("[Elven assets that are worthless to a creditor in
the event of default can be valuable as a form of collateral.").
52. See Kronman, supra note 21, at 14-15.
53. Yarbrough and Yarbrough contend that such retaliation only occurs if "under-
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destruction of the asset is inefficient because it does not achieve any-
thing.' Such a problem also exists with retaliatory trade practices,
which may disintegrate into unproductive sanctioning behavior."
In general, discretionary sanctions have two disadvantages. First,
the potential breaching party will understate the real value of the vul-
nerable asset.5" If the breaching party can convince the non-breaching
party that the value of the asset is very low, then the non-breaching
party will not believe it has enough leverage to force the breaching
party to perform the rest of the agreement.
Second, discretionary sanctions may discourage efficient breach if
the value of the asset to the potential breaching party exceeds the
benefit from treaty violation. Faced with the possibility of risking dam-
age to the vulnerable asset, a party might choose to comply with an
agreement even though the benefits of violating the agreement exceed
the costs that would be imposed by violation.57
B. Collateral: Discretionary Sanctions Available to the Non-breaching
Party
The second method of self-enforcement of agreements is for one
party to provide "collateral" to the other party. Collateral is an asset
the non-breaching party can seize in case of breach.' Unlike hostag-
es, collateral has value to the non-breaching party.5"
lying conditions change unexpectedly." Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22,
at 76.
54. Unless the asset in question is the breaching party's reputation, in which
case destruction of the reputation represents information that is valuable to the
breaching party's future trading partners.
55. Kronman, supra note 21, at 93.
56. See id. at 14.
57. The same problem may occur with collateral if the value of the collateral
exceeds the benefit of violation.
58. Yarbrough and Yarbrough claim that an antidumping bond is an example of
collateral. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and
Economic 'Hostages. Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade, 30 INT'L STUD.
Q. 7, 17-18 (1986) [hereinafter Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986)]. An antidumping
bond is posted by a company about to face trade litigation in the United States
before certain tribunals. If the company loses, the plaintiff can recover against the
bond insurer rather than the company itself. The antidumping bond is posted by a
company when an antidumping proceeding begins, too late to ensure compliance.
Thus, an antidumping bond is really not a hostage, "a payment that changes hands
contingent on compliance with the agreement." Id. at 17. The bond merely ensures
that the antidumping duty will be collected if levied.
Benjamin Klein gives an example of collateral as the capital investments
made by a franchisee. The franchisor typically owns the land on which the franchi-
see does business. Any capital investments made by the franchisee are worthless in
the case of termination. Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629 n. 14 (1981).
59. Kronman, supra note 21, at 30 n. 15.
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The advantage of collateral is that the non-breaching party need
not engage in negotiations with the breaching party to protect itself
from breach.' Furthermore, a threat to foreclose on the collateral is
more credible than a threat to destroy a hostage because the non-
breaching party would acquire the value of the collateral. If the value
of the collateral is greater than the value of performance, then the
non-breaching party will be fully protected from breach. A disadvan-
tage is that the non-breaching party may be tempted to seize the col-
lateral without provocation and forego further contractual perfor-
mance.6 1 Another problem is that if the value of the collateral is less
than the value of continued performance, then the non-breaching party
is underesecured. It must rely on its ability to threaten to deprive the
non-breaching party of the value of the collateral. 2
An example of collateral in international relations is the ability of
a GATT signatory to raise its tariffs in response to a violation of the
GATT by another country. Such an action harms the offending country
by hurting its export industry.' The action simultaneously benefits
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. Kronman analyzes the problem of opportunistic seizure using three sce-
narios. In the first, the value of the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching
party than the benefits of continued performance of the contract, so the non-breach-
ing party is completely secured. Kronman uses the following example:
Suppose that you have now given me a golden goblet as collateral to
secure your promise to deliver [a] calf once it is born. The goblet, let us
assume, is worth as much to me as the calf - it is, therefore, a perfect
form of collateral.
Id.
In the second scenario, the collateral is worth more to the breaching party
than it is to the non-breaching party. This assumption is realistic because if the
collateral was worth less to the breaching party, then the breaching party would
have already sold the collateral to the non-breaching party: "We can also assume
that the goblet is worth at least as much to you (it may be worth more), since oth-
erwise you would already have sold or traded it to me." Id. at 16-17.
In the third, performance is worth more to the non-breaching party than the
cost of performing. Otherwise, the non-breaching party would not have agreed to the
contract:
[Aissume that you value the goblet more than the calf. [This] as-
sumption follows from two premises: first, that the goblet is worth as
much to me as the calf (that it is a complete substitute for the calf and
hence a perfect form of collateral), and second, that the calf is worth
more to me than to you, as it must be, or we would not have agreed to
our original exchange.
Id. at 17. Because the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching party than the
benefits of continued performance of the contract (first scenario), and because perfor-
mance is worth more to the non-breaching party than the cost of performing (third
scenario), the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching party than the cost of
performing is to the breaching party.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Some authors have claimed, however, that an increase in tariffs sometimes
helps the exporting industry of the offending country by raising the price of its
products.
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the retaliating country by boosting the domestic price of imported
products, thus increasing profits in those industries that compete with
imports.64 Another example of the use of collateral occurred when the
United States froze Iranian assets in response to the Iranian capture
of U.S. hostages in 1979. The United States could have converted the
bank accounts to its own use.6 Instead, the U.S. released the assets
after Iran released the Americans held hostage in Iran.
C. Hand-Tying: Mandatory Penalties
Hand-tying is defined as "actions that make a promise more credi-
ble by putting it out of the promisor's power to breach without incur-
ring costs he could otherwise have avoided."" According to Kronman,
hand-tying occurs when the destruction of an asset would be automat-
iC67ic.
6
The literature on hand-tying falls into two categories. The first,
encompassing the works of Kronman" and Telser,6 holds that some
agreements are self-enforcing because parties wish to retain the future
benefits of performance by the other party.7° The second set of theo-
64. This is a political benefit since it helps producers at the expense of consum-
ers. Classical economic theory teaches that the costs to consumers of tariffs often
outweigh the benefits to consumers.
65. For example, in 1963, the United States seized all Cuban assets in the
United States. The United States sold the assets in order to pay for the expenses of
determining the losses suffered by American companies during Cuba's nationalization
decrees. See HENKIN, supra note 17, at 346. See also 28 Fed. Reg. 6974-85 (1963);
78 Stat. 1110, 22 U.S.C. § 1643(0) (1964), amended, 79 Stat. 988, 22 U.S.C. § 1643(j)
(1976).
66. Kronman, supra note 21, at 18.
67. Kronman differs in terminology from Yarbrough & Yarbrough, who use the
term "hostage" to refer to all losses to a breaching party automatically resulting
from breach. For example, the future benefits of an agreement are a "hostage."
Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11 ("A more general form of
hostage is the future benefits expected from the continuation of a trading relation-
ship."). Since Yarbrough & Yarbrough assume that any future benefits are lost
automatically upon breach, such future benefits would fall under Kronman's rubric of
"hand-tying." But again, the difference is merely in terminology. Another difference
in terminology results from the fact that if one party would incur costs from ter-
minating the contract (ties its hands), the same costs could be imposed by the other
party's termination. Thus, an asset that is a hand-tying commitment is also an
economic hostage: The asset can be destroyed at the discretion of the other party.
Because hand-tying and hostages are different sides of the same coin, one under-
stands Yarbrough & Yarbrough's reference to both as "economic hostages."
68. See Kronman, supra note 21.
69. See Telser, supra note 39, at 1.
70. One may wonder why a breaching state would automatically lose the benefits
of the treaty. Indeed, a non-breaching state might continue to comply with the trea-
ty, thus continuing to confer benefits on the breaching state, even though the non-
breaching state has the discretion to abrogate the treaty by invoking the doctrine of
retaliatory breach. The answer lies in the behavioral assumption that all states
unilaterally pursue policies that are in their best interest. If a state modifies its
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ries, advanced by Klein & Leffler 7 and Williamson,72 and applied to
international agreements by Yarbrough & Yarbrough,73 holds that
parties will comply with agreements in order to avoid losing the value
of assets that are not useful outside the agreement. Qualitatively,
these two sets of theories are convergent because the benefit of pre-
serving a transaction-specific asset is also a benefit of complying with
the agreement.
Telser introduced the theory that an agreement might be self-
enforcing if the threat of loss of future benefits of the treaty is a suffi-
cient incentive for states to comply with a treaty.74 In Yarbrough &
Yarbrough's terminology, E(c) is the discounted present value of the
stream of benefits to the breaching part if both parties comply, E(n) is
the discounted present value of the stream of benefits to the breaching
party if both parties do not comply, and E(v) is the discounted present
value of the amount that the breaching party expects to gain from the
violation. Parties will comply with an agreement if E(c) - E(n) >
E(v).75 A party would adhere to such an agreement even if there were
no courts or third party enforcement mechanisms because if "one party
violates the terms then the only recourse of the other is to terminate
the agreement."7"
Klein & Leffler argue that the prospect of repeat business and
future profits deters firms from breaching contracts.7 7 In sales of
optimal unilateral policy through a treaty, such a concession was probably traded for
some reciprocal concession by the other state. If the other state violates the treaty,
then the quid pro quo is dissolved. There is no reason for the non-breaching state to
continue complying with the agreement. The non-breaching state reverts back to its
unilateral policies, which, by definition, are different from its treaty obligations.
71. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 58.
72. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985).
73. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22.
74. See Telser, supra note 39.
75. Kronman, supra note 21, at 20. More generally, hand-tying works only if the
costs of breaching the agreement outweigh the benefits of the breach.
76. Telser, supra note 39, at 27.
77. In Klein & Leffler's model, there is no governmental mechanism to enforce a
manufacturer's implied warranties. The only reason a manufacturer would produce
high-quality goods is the prospect of repeat business:
Contracts are not enforceable by the government or any third party.
Transactors are assumed to rely solely on the threat of termination of
the business relationship for the enforcement of contractual promises.
Klein & Leffler, supra note 58, at 616. Potential purchasers are assumed to be un-
able to determine the specific level of product quality before the purchase. Id. at
620. Klein & Leffler assume that if a seller loses its reputation as a result of selling
a product of less-than-contracted-for quality, it will lose both the benefits under the
immediate contract in question and the opportunity to make future contracts. Id.
("[11f quality is less than contracted for, all consumers cease to purchase from the
particular sampled "cheating firm."). Presumably, the seller will keep the profits it
made from the low-quality products themselves.
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goods, the seller will reduce quality only if "the one-time wealth in-
crease obtained from low quality production" exceeds the "continual
stream of rental income that will be lost if low quality output is decep-
tively produced."78 Knowing this, consumers buy only from firms that
charge a high price, or more specifically, a price above salvageable
cost.79
This "quality-assuring price" is the price at which firms produce
high quality goods. Klein & Leffler point out that if the quality-assur-
ing price were greater than total costs," other firms would enter the
market, causing the price to fall.81 However, consumers demand that
price be at least equal to the quality-assuring price." The result is
that firms make firm-specific capital investments in the form of either
(1) brand name capital investments or (2) nonsalvageable productive
assets.'
While Klein & Leffler explain why parties invest in firm-specific
capital, Oliver Williamson uses transactional economics to explain how
the presence of firm-specific capital affects the type of governance
structure controlling the relationship.' For Williamson, transactional
economics makes two fundamental assumptions about human behav-
ior: rationality and self-interest.'
78. Id. at 620. One crucial, but reasonable, assumption in product markets is
that consumers can identify the supplier of each product.
79. Price must be above salvageable costs. Id. at 618. Otherwise, the firm would
have nothing to lose from producing lower quality goods. See ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 105 (Edwin
Cannan, ed., 1937) (1776).
80. Klein & Leffler distinguish between sunk and salvageable costs. Klein &
Leffler, supra note 58, at 619.
81. Id. at 625 ("Thus, if price assures quality, the firms producing quality great-
er than q(min) appear to earn positive economic profits. However, this cannot de-
scribe a full market equilibrium. When the price is high enough to assure a particu-
lar high level of quality, additional firms have an incentive to enter the industry.").
82. Id. ("Consumers know that any price below P(*) for its associated quality
results in the supply of q(min). They therefore will not purchase from a firm promis-
ing that quality at a lower than P(*).").
83. Id. at 626-29.
84. See Williamson, supra note 72. Transactional economics has been referred to
alternatively as "transaction costs economics" or "neoinstitutional economics," al-
though Williamson refers to transaction cost economics as a subset of, not a syn-
onym of, new institutional economics. Id. at 16. See also Ronald Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 16 ECONOMICA 386 (1960); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (Coase is credited with founding transactional economics);
Thriiinn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990) (surveying
neoinstitutional economics).
85. Regarding rationality, Williamson uses a semistrong form, called "bounded
rationality," in which economic actors are assumed to be "intendedly rational, but
only limitly so." Williamson, supra note 72, at 45 (citations omitted). Bounded ratio-
nality differs from "maximizing" rationality, the strong form assumption prevalent in
microeconomics. Unlike maximizing rationality, bounded rationality assumes that
there are limits on the human ability to plan for the future and anticipate contin-
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Williamson identifies three important dimensions that affect, and
may ultimately transform, the economic relationship between two
parties. The first dimension is the degree of "asset specificity."" Asset
specificity refers to the creation of an asset that has increased value
only when used in a certain way. Williamson explains that
parties to a transaction commonly have a choice between special
purpose and general purpose investment. Assuming that contracts
go to completion as intended, the former will often permit cost
savings to be realized. But such investments also are risky, in that
specialized assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of produc-
tive value if contracts should be interrupted or prematurely termi-
nated. General purpose investments do not pose the same difficul-
ties. "Problems" that arise during contract execution can be solved
in a general purpose asset regime by each party going his
way .... 87
A transaction-specific asset is not the same as a fixed asset. Many
gencies. Id. at 46. Williamson argues that limits on people's competence is different
than the neoclassical assumption of information costs:
There is . . . a fundamental difference between a situation in which a
decision maker is uncertain about the state X and a situation in which
the decision has not given any thought to whether X matters or not,
between a situation in which a prethought event judged of low probabili-
ty occurs and a situation in which something occurs that never has
been thought about .... Most complex models of maximizing choice do
not come to grips with the problem of bounded rationality. Only meta-
phorically can a limited information model be regarded as a model of
decision with limited cognitive abilities.
RICHARD R. NELSON AND S.G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 66-67 (1982), quoted in Williamson, supra note 72, at 46 n. 6. Bounded
rationality is also distinguished from "organic rationality," the assumption that peo-
ple maximize welfare indirectly through trial and error. Id. 46-47.
Secondly, Williamson assumes that people are "opportunistic." Opportunistic
parties are willing to break the rules to increase their welfare. Id. at 47-49. They
are also willing to lie, steal, cheat, and refuse to disclose information. The assump-
tion that actors behave without regard to rules is appropriate in international af-
fairs. It accommodates the realist critique that international law is unenforceable. By
contrast, neoclassical economics employs the semistrong form of "simple self-interest
seeking," which holds that individuals play within the rules. Id. at 49. It treats
"individuals as playing a game with fixed rules that they obey. They do not buy
more than they can pay for, they do not embezzle funds, they do not rob banks."
Williamson rejects the weak form of self-interest that assumes that people obey all
rules. Id. at 49. This "obedience" assumption has been summarized as follows:
One can imagine the limiting case of a monolithic collectivism in which
the prescriptions of the central plan are carried out by functionaries
who fully identify with the imposed macrogoals. In such a system the
economically relevant processes reduce almost completely to technical
manipulations.
ADOLPH LOWE, ON ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: TOWARD A SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECO-
NOMICS 142 (1965), quoted in Williamson, supra note 72, at 49.
86. Williamson, supra note 72, at 52-56.
87. Id. at 54.
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assets that are regarded as fixed can be redeployed to another use,
such as general purpose buildings." One example of transaction-spec-
ific asset is where a tailor promises to make a suit of clothes for a buy-
er.89 If the tailor initially cuts the fabric to fit the dimensions of the
suit, the tailor has dedicated a certain amount of investment (the val-
ue of the cloth for the suit) towards performing the contract. If he does
not make the suit for the buyer, the cloth becomes worthless." Anoth-
er example of an transaction-specific investment is the investment
created when an importing country requires imported goods to meet
peculiar standards.9" "Such standards are ideal for the provision of
hostages because the standards involve investment in specialized capi-
tal equipment or production procedures which are non-salvageable if
the market for which they are designed are lost."92 An electronics firm
that builds a factory necessary to produce an electric plug meeting an
importing country's regulations is providing a transaction-specific as-
set.93
Williamson's second dimension is uncertainty, defined as the in-
ability of parties to predict the behavior of others, either because op-
portunistic behavior is difficult to predict or because of communication
failures. Williamson's third dimension is frequency.
Williamson coined the term "fundamental transformation" to de-
scribe the change from a party's prebargain situation in which the
company has many potential business partners to the post-bargain
situation in which an agreement has been reached with one partner
and asset-specificity has been developed. The presence of asset-specific-
ity deters breach by the asset owner.95 As a result, the other party is
more likely to enter into the contract. Although asset-specificity en-
courages the asset holder to comply, it also encourages the other party
to breach. The party who owns the specific asset is subject to the op-
portunistic behavior of the other party." For example, a buyer may be
willing to pay $10 for a product that requires the manufacturer of the
product to build a factory at the cost of $5. Before the factory is built,
88. Id.
89. Kronman, supra note 21, at 19.
90. Id.
91. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 10-11.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 92. Another example are
the Canadian regulations that require that imports of canned goods meet container-
size requirement. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11.
94. WILLIAMSON, supra note 72, at 54.
95. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11. ("The fact that the
exporting country stands to lose the hostage (the value of ... equipment) as pun-
ishment for any opportunistic behavior against the U.S. may serve as a mechanism
for enforcing existing agreements.").
96. Paradoxically, the same factor that gives rise to the need for an enforcement
mechanism provides the enforcement mechanism itself.
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the parties would'agree to any price between $5 (the lowest price the
manufacturer would pay) and $10 (the highest price the buyer would
accept). But after the factory is built, the manufacturer would be will-
ing to accept any price, even $1, because the alternative - non-produc-
tion - would not result in any profit at all.97 Although the buyer
would be willing to pay $10, it is likely that the buyer will negotiate a
lower price ex post because of the seller's vulnerability.
One example of pre-commitment through hand-tying is reputation.
If a person violates an agreement, that person's reputation is damaged
automatically. On its face, reputation sounds like an ephemeral and
non-economic idea, but reputation represents a useful asset. A busi-
ness with a good reputation will receive future sales. Therefore, a
court, when deciding the amount of damages to award to a business,
would not award damages for lost reputation and lost sales. The two
are synonymous. A problem with reputation as a commitment is that it
is difficult to calibrate the value of the commitment to the seriousness
of breach. Thus, the damage to a state's reputation may differ from the
cost of breach. If the damage to reputation is greater than the cost of
breach, then some efficient breaches may be overdeterred. If the dam-
age to reputation is less than the benefit of breach, then some ineffi-
cient breaches may remain underdeterred.
E. Union
The fourth method of reducing opportunism is union. As William-
son states, "[tiransactions that are supported by investments in dura-
ble, transaction-specific assets experience 'lock in' effects, on which
account autonomous trading will commonly be supplanted by unified
ownership (vertical integration)."" The interests of two parties be-
come aligned. In domestic agreements, union is typified by a manufac-
turer who merges with its distributor. The European Union is a so-
phisticated governance structure that illustrates the principle of un-
ion."
Union concludes Kronman's taxonomy of non-legal sanctions.
Charney proposes another taxonomy of nonlegal sanctions, divided into
three major categories." The first category is "relation-specific pro-
spective advantage," which he explains as follows: "The committing
party places a particular asset under the control of another party; that
party will confiscate or destroy the asset if the promisor breaches."'5 '
97. Note that, under the assumption that the manufacturer possesses specific
assets, the manufacturer can sell to only one buyer.
98. Williamson, supra note 74, at 53.
99. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22. These governance structures
are examined infra in section IV(D).
100. Charny, supra note 40, at 392-97.
101. Id. at 392.
VOL. 23:1
1994 EFFICIENT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 205
Examples of "relation-specific prospective advantage" are the ability of
a bank to destroy a small business by calling a note payable on de-
mand and a franchisor's ability to revoke the right to use a trademark.
Both of these examples are probably "hostages" in Kronman's terminol-
ogy. Another example is the opportunity to deal again with the same
party (the "repeat deal"). 2 By comparison, Kronman's terminology
would treat the benefit of future dealings as a hand-tying arrange-
ment.
Charney's second category of non-legal sanctions is reputation. His
third category is the psychic and social costs of breach, including guilt
and loss of self-esteem. 3
F. Side Payments
Under any scheme in which the sanctions for breach are over-
effective - the sanctions for breach exceed the damage of the breach
- efficient breach might still occur if the breaching party bribes the
non-breaching party. Two problems arise in international relations
that create a barrier to side payments. First, it is difficult to express
many treaty obligations in monetary terms. If a state refuses to adhere
to a security treaty, it would be difficult to determine the amount of
money that would compensate the non-breaching state. However, some
non-monetary favors, such as a vote in the U.N., can be exchanged.
Second, even if the damage could be expressed in monetary terms,
there may be a psychological barrier that prevents states from making
cash payments to each other, with the exception of extreme cases, such
as reparations extracted from the loser of a war."
The ineffectiveness of side payments also contributes to
overcompliance. In domestic law, a hostage-taker can be paid off if the
benefits of violation to the breaching part exceed the costs of violation
102. Id. at 393.
103. Id. at 447-48. Beyond mere taxonomy, Charny suggests some changes to do-
mestic law in light of the presence of informal sanctions. He contends that an action
for promissory estoppel should not be available in all instances where a party rea-
sonably relies on a promise. If the reliance is based upon a belief that noncompli-
ance will be punished by nonlegal sanctions, the plaintiff should not recover unless
it was unfeasible to draft a contract incorporating the obligation in question. See
also id. at 447-48, 450. A promisee should be able to recover under promissory
estoppel only if "he can show that his transactional behavior would have been
different had he correctly assessed the probability -of breach." Id. at 455. Thus, it is
not enough that the promisee take actions in purported reliance. Charny suggests
that when parties take formal means of memorializing an agreement, but do not
actually sign a contract, the courts should be reluctant to enforce the promise be-
cause the parties likely considered, but rejected, the alternative of legal enforcement.
Id.
104. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
(1919). In the Treaty of Versailles, the victorious allies extracted reparations from
Germany. Keynes criticized these reparations. Id.
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to the hostage-taker; then, the violation can occur. No retaliatory ac-
tion will be taken because of the transfer payment. As noted above,
however, transfer payments are difficult to make in the international
arena.
IV. BEHAVIOR UNDER VARIOUS STRUCTURAL
CONDITIONS
Armed with an array of non-legal sanctions, a few predictions
about breach and compliance behavior are possible. We have seen how
a court system imposing damages equal to damage done can achieve
an efficient result. However, the penalty for breach is often greater or
less than the actual amount of damage done, and sometimes these is
no penalty at all. An efficient system must impose costs or benefits on
the breaching party with the objective that the breaching party be-
haves efficiently (i.e. efficient breaches occur but no inefficient breach-
es occur). This section outlines the structural details that will result in
efficient compliance behavior by parties to an agreement.
There are a number of elements that affect the compliance and
sanctioning behavior of parties. First, the breaching party benefits
from breaching the contract. Second, breach imposes losses on the non-
breaching party. Third, the breaching party may suffer losses in form
of penalty if it breaches the contract. Penalties can be either discre-
tionary (collateral, or a hostage, using Kronman's terminology) or auto-
matic (hand-tying)."'0 A non-breaching party can choose to waive a
discretionary penalty (for instance, a lawsuit). An automatic penalty
(for instance, the loss of transaction-specific assets) automatically oper-
ates if a party breaches the contract. Fourth, there is the ability of the
non-breaching party to make a side payment to the breaching party to
induce the breaching party not to breach the contract. Fifth, there is
the ability of the breaching party to make a side payment to the non-
breaching party to induce the non-breaching party to forego retaliatory
measures. These five factors determine whether a party may breach a
contract. A few examples will suffice to explain how these factors
would affect the decision to breach or not to breach.
Case 1: No penalties. Examining factors one and two alone, sup-
pose that the non-breaching party cannot impose any type of penalty
and cannot bribe the breaching party not to breach. In this case, the
agreement will be breached if there is any benefit at all to breach,
even if breach is inefficient. This is the simple case of
105. Furthermore, damages can be split along another dimension. Damages can be
pictured as imposed by the judicial system, or as extra-legal damages (damages that
occur from, say, retaliation). We could further distinguish between retaliatory acts
that benefit the retaliating party. If a bank seized the collateral, the bank derives
benefit at the same time the defaulting borrower is harmed. Other retaliatory acts
are purely harmful, such as loss of reputation.
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undercompliance, the cause cdl~bre of the realists' attack on interna-
tional law. An example would be North Korea's refusal to turn over
South Korean prisoners of war in compliance with the armistice ending
the Korean War. South Korea had delivered its prisoners earlier than
North Korea had, and, therefore, it possessed no bargaining power to
hold North Korea to the agreement. °8
Case 2: Exact compensation. Considering the case in which the
non-breaching party can enforce a discretionary penalty equal to the
cost of breach (in effect, if the non-breaching party can sue for damag-
es), breach will occur if the benefits to the breaching party will exceed
the penalty. In the case of inefficient breach, breach will not occur. The
benefits do not exceed the costs, so the benefits do not exceed the dis-
cretionary penalty. Thus, the ability to impose a discretionary penalty
leads to efficient results. It has often been pointed out that the exis-
tence of a discretionary penalty equal to the cost of breach is an unre-
alistic assumption in the international sphere.
Case 3: Mandatory penalty. Considering the case of a mandatory
penalty instead of a discretionary penalty, breach will occur if the
benefits exceed the mandatory penalty. If the penalty is greater than
the cost, an efficient breach will be deterred. If the penalty is less than
cost, an inefficient breach will be allowed to occur. However, if the
penalty is equal to cost, only efficient breach occurs.
Case 4: Opportunistic breach. The discretionary penalty can be
used to extort the other party, even if it has not breached the
agreement. For example, suppose a manufacturer of custom-made
merchandise builds a plant to fulfill its production obligations under a
single contract. Once the plant is established, the buyer has an incen-
tive to threaten to breach the contract unless the manufacturer reduc-
es his price. In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico,0 7 a boat owner
agreed to hire seamen for a fishing voyage. During the voyage, the sea-
men refused to work unless the boat owner paid them wages at a rate
higher than that originally agreed to.
Given opportunity for negotiations, side payments, and flexibility
in the amount of the non-legal sanctions, an efficient result can be
achieved. Because these factors are almost always absent to some
extent, efficient behavior is obstructed.
V. BREACH UNDER VARIOUS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS
Yarbrough & Yarbrough have analyzed the factors that determine
the type of institution that will be used to govern free trade agree-
ments. Yarbrough & Yarbrough refer to their analysis as "the strategic
106. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 78.
107. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
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organizational approach" to international trade policy. The analysis
consists of identifying which of four possible institutional structures
will be chosen by nations that wish to agree to reduce tariffs. Under
each institutional form, parties attempt to create an incentive for effi-
cient compliance behavior.
According to Yarbrough & Yarbrough, institutional forms are de-
signed to prevent opportunism. Opportunism is only present when
there is a relation-specific investment"° (in Williamson's lexicon, "as-
set-specificity"). Yarbrough & Yarbrough supply some useful examples
of asset-specificity in the area of free trade, including
1. Locationally specialized trade facilities (for example, the Soviet-
European gas pipeline);
2. specialized vertical production linkages across national bound-
aries (for example, Canadian-U.S. links in the North American
automobile industry);
3. dedicated assets in the form of export capacity (for example,
Japanese automobile capacity designed to service the U.S. mar-
ket).1°9
An exporting country's economic hostage is its export industry. If the
exporting country violates a free trade agreement, the country risks
that it will lose the value of its specific assets if the other party with-
draws from the agreement.
Generally, the type of institutional framework depends upon three
factors: first, whether there is relation-specific investment; second,
whether there is effective third party enforcement in the form of a
hegemon; and third, whether there is effective third party enforcement
in the form of a regional trade treaty. If there is no relation-specific
investment, unilateral free trade develops. If there is relation-specific
investment, the institutional form depends upon the type of enforce-
ment structure available. Multilateralism prevails if there is a hege-
mon. "Minilateralism" prevails if there is the possibility of negotiating
a regional treaty with third party enforcement. If there is no effective
third party enforcement and no possibility of a regional treaty, bilater-
alism with self-help as a remedy prevails.
A. Unilateralism
The first institutional form is unilateral trade liberalization, de-
fined as a single country's unilateral adoption of a trade policy without
negotiations or agreements with others. For example, if a powerful
country determines that its best policy is free trade, regardless of the
reciprocal trade policies of other countries, the country is relatively
invulnerable to the trade policies of other countries. The country pur-
108. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 34-35.
109. Id. at 25.
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sues open trade but does not attempt to persuade other countries to
adopt liberal policies.110
Under the strict assumption that countries are not affected by
each other's trade policies, there would be no need for cooperation. As
Axelrod and Keohane note, cooperation is defined as "when actors
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of oth-
ers."' A party has no need to attempt to change another's actions
through negotiations if it does not care about the other's actions.
With unilateralism, there is no need for any enforcement mecha-
nism at all."2 Yarbrough & Yarbrough argue that unilateral trade
liberalism is pursued by countries that do not have relation-specific
assets."3 A country without relation-specific assets cannot be a target
for opportunism. Asset-specificity is a characteristic not only of the
physical nature of an asset but of a nation's trading opportunities.
Thus, if a country has only one trading partner, all its export indus-
tries are relation-specific. If a country has several trading partners, its
export industry is no longer relation-specific.
The foremost example of unilateralism is Great Britain's trade
liberalization in the 19th century. Britain did not face the threat of op-
portunism because its export markets were substitutable. As inter-firm
manufacturing trade increased, there was an accompanying increase in
asset-specificity and the resulting potential for opportunism, and
unilateralism declined as an effective trade policy.
B. Bilateral treaties
The second institutional form is bilateral trade. Bilateralism oc-
curs if there is no hegemon, there is a threat of opportunism, and there
is no possibility of third party enforcement.
If a country violates international law, other countries often retal-
iate. The actions and reactions of states throughout history have devel-
oped a body of practice that has coalesced into internatibnal law. The
international law that has developed relating to treaty breach is more
lenient than the law governing breach of domestic agreements. A pos-
sible reason is that international law lacks a "compensation principle"
that induces the parties themselves to determine what breaches are
efficient and inefficient.
Bilateral parties often punish breach of international law for the
110. Id. at 55.
111. ROBERT AXELROD & ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226
(1985).
112. Thus, it is confusing that Yarbrough & Yarbrough characterize unilateralism
as having an enforcement mechanism of self-help. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough
(1992), supra note 22, at 17, Fig. 1.3.
113. Id. at 56.
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sake of deterrence. If a government arrests another government's dip-
lomats, its own diplomats may be arrested. Confiscations of property
by one nation will often be met by retaliatory confiscations by the
other."4 Such retaliation gives teeth to international law.
The retaliatory actions of countries may eventually develop into
rules of customary international law. In international law, state
practice attains the status of customary international law if two re-
quirements are met."' The first requirement is that states follow the
practice. The second requirement, opinio juris, 16 holds that states
engaging in the practice possess the belief that doing so is required by
international law."7 Thus, the mere fact that a certain practice is
prevalent among states is an insufficient basis for international law.
Often a state will follow a rule merely out of fear of retaliation from
other states. Such acquiescence out of fear does not create customary
international law.
Customary rules that have developed through an informal sanc-
tioning process are often efficient. A recent literature has developed on
114. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 54.
115. For general discussions of customary international law, see ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971); Michael
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1974-
75); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); Myres S.
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM.
J. INTVL L. 356 (1955); Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300 (1968); Sir Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public
International Law, 106 Receuil des Cours d'Academie de Droit International
[R.C.A.D.I.1 1 (1962).
116. The full Latin phrase is opinio juris sive necessitatis.
117. The second source of international law listed in the Statute of the I.C.J. is
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of
the International Court of Justice, supra note 34, art. 38(1)(b). See also S.S. Lotus
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266 (customary international law is not a practice adopted "merely for reasons
of political expedience."); In the Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (holding that a practice was customary
international law because it "was accepted by law by the parties and [had] given
rise to a right and correlative obligation."); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 ("Not only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the act, is not in itself
enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremony and proto-
col, that are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated by considerations
of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty."); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Revised) § 102(2) ("Customary international
law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of -legal obligation.").
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the effectiveness of informal sanctions. Professor Richard Epstein ar-
gues that, with respect to domestic tort law regarding negligence, an
informal sanctioning process can create efficient rules.'18 Epstein's
conclusion recognizes that in consensual cases, in which negligence is
the appropriate standard of liability, "custom should be regarded as
conclusive evidence of due care."1"9
In Epstein's view, three factors determine whether legally useful
customs develop. The first factor, "reciprocity," determines whether the
parties occupy symmetrical roles. 20 If a party would be adversely af-
fected by a custom in one transaction and benefitted by the custom in
another transaction, the party is more likely to pick a custom that
would maximize the joint benefits of each party. The concept that par-
ties will attempt to adhere to a rule, rather than to spasmodic practice,
is implicit. Presumably, parties wish to rely on a common history of
analysis rather than recreate a cost-benefit analysis for each occur-
rence.
The second factor is frequency. Custom is more likely to develop
out of frequent transactions, such as purchases or sales, 2 ' than out
of infrequent ones, such as employer liability, medical malpractice, and
product liability cases."2 The third factor is severity. The more se-
vere the harm, the more likely that parties will ignore long-term conse-
quences in order to win the dispute."2
Epstein contends that the last two factors, frequency and severity,
predict when custom may develop. Thus, custom is most likely to de-
velop in cases of high frequency and low severity.2 4 It is less likely in
cases of high frequency transactions with high severity."2 No custom
is likely to develop in low-frequency/low-severity transactions or low
frequency/high-severity transactions."
As Epstein demonstrates, customary rules can be efficient in a
world of informal sanctions among parties. Thus, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that customary international law related to treaty breach will
tend to allow efficient breach and deter inefficient breach.
118. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992).
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 11-12.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 14. ("The immediate players may be so preoccupied by the size of the
stakes in their own transactions (which in the limit could be a rule or ruin situa-
tion) that they will not possess the long time horizon that allows relational gains to
soften the desire for immediate success.").
124. Id. at 13-14.
125. Epstein, supra note 118, at 14-15.
126. Id. at 15-16.
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Most bilateral international agreements have no meaningful third
party determination of when a treaty is broken. 27 Although interna-
tional law requires that a state engage in negotiation before breaching
a treaty,2' many states in practice violate treaties without notice or
negotiation. For example, the United States denounced the Interna-
tional Load-Line Convention in 1939;1"9 France denounced the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1966; and Russia denounced the Trea-
ty of London in 1856. Under international law, there are ample legal
justifications for abrogating a treaty. Many of these doctrines are
vague, however, and can be easily invoked. For instance, a state may
withdraw from a treaty with the consent of all parties to the trea-
ty.-' 3 A state may also withdraw from the terms of a treaty if the
treaty provides for termination, denunciation, or withdrawal.
31
If a treaty does not provide for termination, denunciation, or with-
drawal, a party may withdraw from the treaty if either "it is estab-
lished that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunci-
ation or withdrawal" or "a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be
implied by the nature of the treaty."'32 Brownlie notes that "[wihen a
treaty contains no provisions regarding its termination, the existence
of a right to denunciation depends on the intention of the parties,
which can be inferred from the terms of the treaty and its subject-
matter."'33  Brierly," Fitzmaurice,' 3 ' and Hall" claim that com-
127. For example, multilateral treaties that have some sort of determination are
the GATT, which authorizes a Panel to adjudicate disputes, and the European
Union, which authorizes the European Court of Justice to adjudicate disputes.
128. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the customary
international law relating to treaties, requires in most instances that a breaching
state give 12 months notice of breach and that the breaching party negotiate before
breaching a treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 56.
129. International Load-Line Convention, July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228. The Con-
vention outlaws the overloading of cargo ships.
130. I use the term "withdrawal" synonymously with "terminate" or "denounce."
131. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 54. ("The termination of a treaty or
the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) [iun conformity with the provisions of
the treaty; or (b) [alt any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.").
132. Id. art 56(1)(b).
133. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 496-97 (1966).
134. Brierly notes that commercial treaties and treaties of alliance are probably
subject to denunciation "even though they contain no express provision to that
effect." J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (6th ed. 1963).
135. Fitzmaurice cites commercial or trading arrangements as examples of "certain
sorts of treaties which, unless entered into for a fixed and stated period or ex-
pressed to be in perpetuity, are in their nature such that any of the parties to them
have an implied right to bring them to an end or to withdraw from them." Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties 72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41107 (1957).
136. Hall states that
[a] treaty becomes void . . . [bly denunciation . . . when the treaty, as
in the case of treaties of alliance or commerce, postal conventions and
the like, is voidable at the will of one of the parties, the nature of its
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mercial treaties imply this right. As a result, a party to a commercial
treaty with no provision for termination may denounce it at any time.
According to the Vienna Convention, however, the party must provide
not less than one year's notice before terminating the treaty.137
Under certain circumstances, a party may breach a treaty in re-
taliation for breach by another party. The provoking breach, however,
must be material: it must consist of either a repudiation of the treaty
not sanctioned by international law or "the violation of a provision
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the trea-
ty .138
Once a material breach has been committed, the non-breaching
parties to the treaty have three possible responses. First, the parties
can by unanimous agreement suspend the treaty in whole or in
part.139 Second, "a party specially affected by the breach" may raise
the breach "as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in
whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting
[sltate."4 ° Third, a party may suspend "the treaty in whole or in part
with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material
breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of
every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations
under the treaty."4 '
A party may terminate a treaty if performance becomes impossi-
ble. Impossibility has been interpreted both broadly and narrowly.
Under the broad view, a party may abrogate a treaty if it becomes
physically or morally impossible for the party to perform its obligations
under the treaty.42 Under the narrow view, exemplified by the Vien-
na Convention, "the impossibility [must result] from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the exe-
cution of the treaty." 14 3 It is agreed that the impossibility cannot be
caused by the party's breach of either the agreement or of some other
international legal obligation "owed to any other party to the trea-
contents being such that it is evidently not intended to set up a perma-
nent state of things ....
WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 116, at 405 (A. Pearce
Higgins, ed., 8th ed. 1924).
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 56(2).
138. Id. art. 60(3)(b).
139. Id. art. 60(2)(a).
140. Id. art. 60(2)(b).
141. Id. art. 60(2)(c).
142. CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (3d ed. 1948) ("[T]he arising
of conditions physically or morally incompatible with the fulfillment of the treaty
would either render it void or at least suspend its operation until the conditions had
changed."); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 191
(2d ed. 1984) (referring to Capotorti's view that "impossibility of performance, as an
objective fact, paralyses the treaty in all cases, whatever the cause.").
143. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 61(1).
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ty."144
A fundamental change of circumstances (the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus) may be used to excuse non-performance' but only if (1)
the fundamental change of circumstances "occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty,' 46 (2) the
change of circumstances "was not foreseen by the parties,"147 (3) "the
existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty,"148 and (4) the
change in circumstances radically transformed "the extent of obliga-
tions still to be performed under the treaty. 4 9
Rebus sic stantibus was relied upon to terminate treaties of colo-
nization after World War II. The colonial powers, faced with imminent
loss of their territories, were forced to admit that the treaties support-
ing their empires were no longer valid."5 These terminations illus-
trate the way in which the realities of international relations shaped
international law.
Some observers argue that a state cannot be forced or be expected
to "sacrifice its very existence to uphold its treaty obligations"'51 and
that no nation would consent to its own annihilation. 5 2 Thus, there
may be a self-defense, or national security defense, to treaty perfor-
mance. As evinced by state practice 53 and enunciated by Derek
Bowett,'54 a state has a right to act in self-defense if the aggressor
poses an immediate danger to the security or independence of the
defending state, if the aggrieved state has no alternate means of pro-
tection, and if the state responds proportionately to the danger,
Under the doctrine of reprisal, a state may commit an otherwise
illegal act if the act is committed in retaliation for an international
144. Id. art. 61(2).
145. Id. art. 62 (assuming existence of doctrine by placing restrictions on it); see
also Free Zones (Fr. v. Switz.) 1932 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 46, at 156-58 (June 7)
(assuming that principle existed but not deciding exact scope of principle).
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 62(1).
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 62(1)(a).
149. Id. art. 62(1)(b).
150. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 84.
151. HALL, supra note 136, at 415. ("A treaty therefore becomes voidable so soon
as it is dangerous to the life or incompatible with the independence of a state,
provided that its injurious effects were not intended by the two contracting parties
at the time of its conclusion."); GYORGY HARSZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
THE LAW OF TREATIES 378 (1973); FENWICK, supra note 142, at 454.
152. FENWICK, supra note 142, at 454.
153. See, e.g., SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTAR 133 (1965) (describing Spanish
suspension of ferry service to Gibraltar); Derek W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and
Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1972) (describing Indonesian nationaliza-
tion of Dutch private property in 1958).
154. Bowett, supra note 153, at 10.
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delinquency." States have traditionally used asset freezes and block-
ades - such as the blockade of Cuba by the United States in October
1962 - to achieve political goals.
Some other excuses for treaty non-performance are necessity and
force majeure. One doctrine that deters opportunistic retaliation is the
principle of economic coercion, which may prevent opportunistic rene-
gotiation of treaties. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2625 evinces what some claim to be a general principle of international
law.' 5 It states that "[n]o state may use or encourage the use of eco-
nomic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sover-
eign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind."57 Thus, if
a party threatens to breach a treaty, unless the other state makes a
concession or renegotiates the treaty, such a threat might be deemed
economic coercion.
If a party wishes to terminate, withdraw from, or suspend a
treaty,15 it must comply with the notice requirements of the Vienna
Convention. The notice requirements presumably affect the exercise of
rights under the doctrines of termination under a treaty's provisions
(Article 54(a)), termination by consent of the parties (Article 54(b)),
unilateral withdrawal (Article 56), retaliatory breach (Article 60), im-
possibility of performance (Article 61), fundamental change of circum-
stances (Article 62) discussed above, as well as other provisions. The
breaching party must notify the other parties to the treaty of its claim
and must indicate the "the measure proposed to be taken with respect
to the treaty and the reasons therefor."5 ' If no party objects after at
least three months, or a lesser amount of time in cases of "special
urgency," the party may carry out such termination, withdrawal, or
suspension." Some authorities suggest that in cases of special ur-
gency, the notification requirement can be waived altogether. 6 ' For
155. Id. at 7. See also J.G. STARKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (1989).
156. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I.
185-86 (1982-V). ("2625's prohibition against coercion applies to a state discontinuing
trade with an offending country and imposing as a condition for the resumption of
trade a change in the internal or foreign policy of the offending state.").
157. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8082
(1970).
158. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, art. 65(1) (If the party "invokes either a
defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for impeaching the validi-
ty of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it or suspending its operation.").
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 65(2).
161. Jimndz de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third Century, 159
R.C.A.D.I. 80 (1978) (suggesting that breach enables the aggrieved party to provi-
sionally suspend its own performance notwithstanding the Vienna Convention).
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example, in 1940, the President of the U.S. suspended the operation of
the International Load Line Convention of 193062 on the grounds of
changed shipping conditions brought about by the war in Europe."s
The United States did not give prior notice; rather, it argued that the
notice requirement was inoperable in the "swiftly changing conditions
inherent in the world situation."' If a party objects to breach, the
parties must seek a negotiated solution under Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter."6 If no solution has been reached within one year
after the date on which the objection was raised, any one of the parties
to the dispute may submit the dispute to the Conciliation Commis-
sion.'" The Conciliation Commission reports to the parties its conclu-
sions of facts and laws, but the report "shall not be binding upon the
parties and it shall have no other character than that of recommenda-
tions submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facili-
tate an amicable settlement of the dispute. 67
Thus, under the Vienna Convention, a party may prevent another
party from withdrawing, terminating, or suspending a treaty by re-
fraining to give consent. Although the rest of the Vienna Convention is
generally accepted as declaratory of international law, the procedural
provisions contained in Articles 65 and Articles 68 may not represent
international law because they do not conform to the practice of states.
For example, the United States, in withdrawing from the International
Load-Line Convention on the basis of a fundamental change of circum-
stances, did not attempt to negotiate its withdrawal.
Despite the multiplicity of doctrines and treatises related to non-
performance of treaties," international relations theorists have ex-
pressed disappointment in the sophistication of the law of treaty non-
162. International Load-Line Convention, supra note 129.
163. Herbert W. Briggs, Editorial Comment, The Attorney-General Invoked Rebus
Sic Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1942); see also Letter from Acting Attorney
General Francis Biddle to President Franklin D. Roosevelt of July 28, 1941, 40
OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ArTTs GEN. OF THE U.S. 119 (1949).
164. Letter of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle, supra note 163, at 123.
165. The United Nations Charter, article 33, provides that
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to en-
danger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 66, Annex.
167. Id. Annex(6).
168. See, e.g. ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL
BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS (1975); Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of
Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 51 (1974).
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performance. Yet these doctrines, however undeveloped when com-
pared with domestic law, seem to allow broad room for non-compliance
with treaty obligations.
Excusing breach is conducive to efficient breach only if the legal
doctrines that allow a state to abrogate a treaty are coextensive with
efficient breach; i.e., non-performance is allowed only if breach would
be efficient. One way to test this hypothesis might be to compare ex-
cuses for treaty performance with actual clauses in treaties that pro-
vide for repudiation. If a treaty specified the conditions for breach,169
one would expect that the treaty allows efficient breach and forbids
inefficient breaches. A treaty that did not allow for an efficient breach
would unnecessarily impose costs upon the breaching party. Because
parties to a contract will not impose an inefficient term upon a party,
efficient breach will be allowed.170
C. Multilateralism and GATT
Another institutional form is multilateralism. Multilateralism
arises when a hegemon creates an entire governance system for free
trade; the hegemon may do so in two different ways. First, it may
bribe countries to sign a multilateral agreement. For example, the
United States bribed other countries to join GATT by (1) allowing the
preference system among commonwealth countries, (2) permitting
discrimination against its imports during the early years of GATT, and
(3) providing foreign aid to Europe.'71 Second, the hegemon may pun-
ish those who breach the agreement. Both unilateralism and
multilateralism involve a hegemon. In multilateralism, however, the
hegemon actively punishes other countries for defecting (as well as
offering them incentives to comply), whereas in unilateralism the hege-
mon does not care about, and is not affected by, the policies of other
nations.
Countries abided by the GATT, according to Yarbrough &
Yarbrough, because of the implicit threat that the United States would
retaliate against defectors. In particular, the escape clause allowed the
United States to retaliate legally."' In recent years, the credibility of
the U.S. threat of retaliation has declined because the position of the
U.S. as a hegemon has eroded. The importance of the GATT has de-
clined, too, as international trade outside the GATT has grown and as
169. A treaty might not specify conditions for breach, in which case the custom-
ary international law regarding breach applies.
170. The GATT signatories have freely adopted a broad excuse provision. For a
discussion of GATT, see Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 255 (1991).
171. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 62-63.
172. Id. at 64.
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countries have erected non-tariff barriers to trade.17 As a result,
"[a]greements must become more self-contained and rely on internal
mechanisms for enforcement instead of a third party in the form of a
hegemon."174 Because the United States is no longer a hegemon in
the world trade community, the GATT today has perhaps moved closer
to Yarbrough & Yarbrough's model of bilateralism.
One primary GATT enforcement mechanism is retaliation by in-
jured countries in the form of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
By and large, this governance mechanism appears to conform with the
efficient breach notion that an injured party should be awarded the
amount of damage done. Import duties result in higher prices, which
compensate producer groups. Although economic theory suggests that
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties are inefficient from an
aggregative welfare standpoint, international actors are not motivated
by aggregate efficiency but rather by the power of special interest
groups.
175
Thus, Sykes argues that certain actions will be inefficient from
the economic standpoint but efficient from the political standpoint. One
interpretation is that the GATT escape clause, Article XIX, prevents
countries from enacting more drastic protectionist measures. 7 " Arti-
cle XIX easily dispenses protectionism without the necessity of violat-
ing an international agreement.
The escape clause was included in GATT at the insistence of the
U.S. negotiator. 177 U.S. policy, according to public choice theory, is
driven primarily by producers, who have a more concentrated interest
in trade policy than do consumers. As a result, although free trade is
efficient, it may not always prevail. Sykes argues that the GATT es-
cape clause reduces the possibility of adverse political consequences to
the GATT negotiators by allowing them to escape their GATT obliga-
173. Id. at 67.
174. Id.
175. That interest groups control trade policy is perhaps an oversimplification.
There are many theories that seek to explain free trade. See RONALD RoGOwsKI,
COMMERCE AND COALITIONS (1989). One theory holds that the scarce factor of pro-
duction will oppose free trade and the abundant factor will favor free trade. Id. See
also James Cassing, Timothy J. McKeown & Jack Ochs, The Political Economy of
the Tariff Cycle, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843-62 (1986). According to business cycle
theory, free trade will occur during booms; protection will occur during busts. Id. See
also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). According to hege-
monic stability theory, free trade occurs when one nation has a large market share
of international trade. The most relevant theory for these purposes is the public
choice theory or "rent seeking" theory, which postulates that there will be free trade
only if it is favored by the politically powerful economic groups in society. The most
powerful group is the producer group, not the consumer group, because the benefits
to the producer group are more concentrated than the costs to consumers. Id.
176. Sykes, supra note 170, at 273-74.
177. Id. at 274.
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tions when there was domestic political pressure to protect certain
industries.178 Like Yarbrough & Yarbrough, Sykes views the GATT
as a self-enforcing agreement.
Another breach provision in GATT is Article XXVIII, which allows
a country to renegotiate a tariff binding. Sykes argues that such ex
post negotiation is allowed in order to avoid deciding, ex ante, all types
of contingencies that would allow breach. 79 If negotiations fail, then
the GATT allows a country to breach, but only at the risk that other
countries may withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions." This,
too, is a way of punishing the offender for damage done. Interestingly,
the enforcement measure is discretionary, not automatic.
D. Minilateralism and the European Community
The fourth institutional form is minilateralism, which crosses the
boundary from anarchy to organized government. The conditions under
which minilateralism arises are (1) the presence of specific trade-relat-
ed investment and (2) the creation of effective third-party enforce-
ment."18
Yarbrough & Yarbrough's example of minilateralism is the Euro-
pean Community (and Union) from 1986 forward. Before 1986,
Yarbrough & Yarbrough contend, the EEC was characterized by anar-
chic types of enforcement. Many countries actually refused to comply
with Community directives:
The French defied an injunction of the Community Court by forbid-
ding imports of British lamb. The British and West German gov-
ernments threatened to withhold their legally required financial
contributions to the Community in response to a budget increase.
The British refused to comply with their Community obligations
without a reduction in their budgetary contribution. French subsi-
dies to turkey farmers, alleged by Britain to be illegal under Com-
munity policy, caused Britain to suspend vaccinating birds against
pests - to justify a policy of keeping out French turkeys to protect
the newly disease-vulnerable British birds.'
The turning point was the Single European Act in 1985, when voting
by the Council of Ministers was changed from unanimous voting to
qualified majority voting. Yarbrough & Yarbrough contend that before
this turning point, enforcement of EEC law was impossible because the
necessary unanimous vote could never be reached.
International institutions such as GATT and the European Union
provide a middle ground between treaty law and federalism. One func-
178. Id. at 278-80.
179. Id. at 283.
180. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 90, Fig. 5.1.
181. Id. at 94.
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tion of such institutions is to lend precision to the circumstances under
which a country should be punished by its trade partners. Axelrod and
Keohane summarize this function as follows:
Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defec-
tion and thereby make it more costly. Insofar as they specify pre-
cisely what reciprocity means in the relevant issue-area, they make
it easier to establish a reputation for practicing precisely because
others will be more willing to make agreements with governments
that can be expected to respond to cooperation with cooperation.182
Axelrod and Xeohane identify a theoretical gap that exists when
discussing the effect of institutions." 3 "Upward looking" theories fo-
cus on the behavior of individual actors. "Downward-looking" theories
examine the implications for actors of the way in which the entire
institution is organized. Such downward-looking theories are public
goods and market failure.
One theory, neo-functionalism, appears to have bridged the gap
between actor-oriented theories and state-oriented theories. Neo-
functionalism attempts to explain how national actors begin to shift
their loyalties towards a regional government."' Actors are assumed
to be self-interested groups and political parties that favor integration
to accomplish their own goals. These groups influence the supra-state
political actors, namely the European Council and the European Com-
mission. Neo-functionalism postulates that there is an economic and
political spillover effect whereby "any integrative action in one sector
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by
taking further actions in related sectors."1"
For neo-functionalists, the processes of integration created "an
integrated and enforceable body of community law. " " The increased
enforceability of this law can be traced through a series of landmark
opinions of the European Court of Justice. In van Gend & Loos, the
Court held that a private company could directly invoke certain provi-
sions of the Treaty of Rome against the Dutch government."8 7 In Cos-
ta v. Enel, the Court held that Community law was supreme above na-
tional law.1" In other decisions, the Court has held that certain trea-
ty provisions and community legislation have direct application with-
182. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 111, at 252.
183. Id. at 252.
184. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 53 (1993) (quoting Ernst Haas, Inter-
national Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT'L ORG. 315,
366 (1961)).
185. Burley & Mattli, supra note 184, at 55.
186. Id. at 57.
187. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport & Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &
Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
188. Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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out the necessity of national enabling legislation.
There is very little room in the European Union treaties for
breach. The Treaty of Rome contains no escape clauses. Furthermore,
there are no provisions for termination of the treaty. Although termi-
nation of the treaty might be allowed under the customary interna-
tional law related to treaty termination, a country's withdrawal would
result in its loss of the reciprocal benefits of Union membership, a
cataclysmic fallout.189
Minor violations of treaty provisions have been shut down by
heightened enforcement since 1986; nations seeking to evade their
treaty obligations find little solace in the text of the Treaty of Rome or
in community legislation. There are no countervailing duties or anti-
dumping duties to be used or abused.
We are left with a question of why unification reduces the oppor-
tunities for parties to breach the agreement. The answer is that great-
er unification leads to reciprocal recognition of the welfare of other
countries' interest groups. Suppose, for instance, that low-cost Italian
steel manufacturers begin to gain market share from British steel
manufacturers. Ordinarily, British steel companies would put pressure
on the legislature for protective tariffs on subsidies. Possibly, the steel
companies would succeed in overrunning the diffused interests of the
steel consumers."g But with integration, the Italian steel companies
would register their political preferences for free trade, perhaps coun-
terbalancing the British producer interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that nations seek to maximize the welfare of
interest groups, they also seek to generate efficient compliance behav-
ior in the same way as private parties do. In anarchy, the sanctions
available to punish non-compliance with agreements are often too
clumsy to perfectly generate efficient behavior. Because informal sanc-
tions are not as precise as court-ordered damages, parties to interna-
tional agreements face high negotiating costs. If negotiations fail to
reach the efficient result, there will be overcompliance and
undercompliance with agreements. As institutions become more sophis-
ticated, remedies for breach become more precise and the idea of effi-
cient breach becomes correspondingly more robust. After a certain
189. The reduction in trade barriers has led European industries to make in-
vestments that hinge upon continued participation in the European Union. One such
type of investment is the building of plants that capitalize on Union-wide economies
of scale.
190. Under GATT, the British steel companies could convince the British govern-
ment to levy anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties on Italian imports,
assuming that the Italians engaged in dumping or subsidies. See Bovard, supra note
26 (collecting instances of American retaliatory action).
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point, centralization requires the disposal of the domestic contract law
analogy entirely.
In light of the infrequency of treaty breach, and given the decen-
tralized nature of international law, international law contains a sur-
prisingly complex set of rules governing termination. The explanation
for this may be the lack of compensation in international relations. In
domestic law, private actors are forced to compensate each other for
breach, thereby determining for themselves when it is efficient to
breach a contract. In international law, however, this selection must be
done through a legal mechanism, through custom, or both.
International agreements are not motivated by a state's total
economic welfare but by the welfare of powerful interest groups. As a
result, we would expect that doctrines forgiving treaty termination
would hinge upon variations on the welfare of the powerful political
groups. This expectation is borne out in the GATT, which calibrates
the escape clause and the ability to levy retaliatory duties on the mis-
fortunes of producer groups. In the European Union, integrationist ten-
dencies eliminate some barriers to trade and also eliminate most ex-
cuses for treaty breach. Changed circumstances that adversely affect
one politically powerful producer group usually improve the lot of an-
other producer group in the Union. As economic welfare is aggregated
across economic groups, fewer breaches of treaty obligations are politi-
cally efficient from a Union perspective. It is perhaps more expeditious
to eliminate any recourse to breach.
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